Can a child become emancipated from one parent for the purpose of financial aid in school?
Full Question:
Answer:
Joint custody of a child requires both parents to cooperate in deciding major issues affecting their children, including, but not limited to, major medical needs, religious training, and education. The parties must be able to cooperate effectively and consistently in matters that directly affect the joint parenting of the child. In some cases, the failure of a parent to cooperate maty be addressed by a contempt motion to the court to enforce the terms of a divorce decree.
Eligibility for financial aid is partly determined by the Expected Family Contribution (EFC). The financial aid office at your school will use your EFC and other information to determine the amount of financial aid for which you are eligible. A financial aid award is determined by each school based on your eligibility and the cost of attendance for your program. All the data used to calculate the EFC come from the information the student provides on the FAFSA. A minor who is currently emancipated by a court order doesn't need to provide parental financial information and has independent status. The CPS analyzes the information from the FAFSA and calculates the EFC. The EFC measures the family’s financial strength on the basis of the family’s income and assets. The EFC formula also takes into account the family’s expenses relative to the number of persons in the household and how many of them will be attending college during the award year.
Emancipation is a matter of judicial determination in MA. When a child is self-supporting and living independently, it is possible for the court to declare the child emancipated, but an emancipated child is an adult and no longer under the custody or care of either parent. It isn't possible to be emancipated from one parent and not the other. There is no formal procedure in Massachusetts for a child to become emancipated from his/her parents. Most judges will not grant a child emancipated status. However, a child may still file for emancipation in the Probate and Family Court of his or her county despite the lack of a formal procedure. In rare situations where a judge is convinced that emancipation is in the best interest of the minor and that the parents are not using it to get out of paying child support, the judge may grant emancipation.
The following is a MA case dealing with emancipation:
LARSON v. LARSON, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 418 (1991)
569 N.E.2d 406
JUDY R. LARSON vs. RICHARD A. LARSON.
No. 90-P-1297.
Appeals Court of Massachusetts.
Middlesex.
December 17, 1990.
April 1, 1991.
Present: ARMSTRONG, FINE, & LAURENCE, JJ.
Divorce and Separation, Separation agreement, Jurisdiction,
Child support, Attorney's fees. Jurisdiction, Probate Court.
Probate Court, Jurisdiction. Contempt. Res Judicata.
Judgment, Preclusive effect. Practice. Civil, Relief from
judgment, Appeal, Attorney's fees.
A Probate Court judge had jurisdiction, pursuant to a separation
agreement incorporated into, but explicitly surviving, the
parties' divorce judgment, to enter civil contempt judgments
against the husband for refusing to make financial support
payments on behalf of an adult child who had attained the age
of twenty-one, notwithstanding the husband's contention that,
despite the agreement's bestowing jurisdiction on the Probate
Court over disputes as to its meaning and application, the
wife was precluded from relying on the agreement by the
doctrines of claim preclusion [426-427], issue preclusion
[427], and judicial estoppel [427-428] because she had waived
her rights to child support pursuant to the agreement by
allowing certain earlier litigation to proceed solely on the
basis of the age provisions of G.L.c. 208, § 28 [424-428].
COMPLAINT for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of the
Probate and Family Court Department on June 20, 1979.
Proceedings for contempt, commenced on May 29, 1990, and August
29, 1990, respectively, were heard by Edward M. Ginsburg, J.,
and motions for a new trial and for relief from judgment were
also heard by him.
Edwin C. Hamada (Theresa Kelly Banash with him) for Richard
A. Larson.
Stephen C. Maloney for Judy R. Larson.
LAURENCE, J.
The present appeal contests the validity of Probate Court
contempt judgments against Richard A. Larson (Richard) for
refusing to make child support payments to Judy R. Larson (Judy),
as required by a separation agreement
Page 419
(the agreement) incorporated into, but explicitly surviving, the
parties' divorce judgment.[fn1] Richard presents several
arguments against the judgments and the judge's refusal to set
them aside on his motions. All of them condense to a single
proposition: that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction to enter
the judgments. Richard's position, however, is based upon a
misreading of a prior opinion of this court and a misapplication
of principles of res judicata and related doctrines. We,
accordingly, affirm the judgments.
1. The prior proceedings. Richard, a surgeon, and Judy, a
homemaker, obtained a judgment of divorce nisi from the Middlesex
Probate and Family Court on March 31, 1983. The judgment ordered
the parties to comply with the provisions of the agreement, which
expressly survived the judgment with independent legal
significance. The agreement required that Richard would pay Judy,
as unallocated alimony for her support and that of the three
children of the marriage (who were then nineteen, sixteen, and
thirteen years old), the sum of $2,500 per month.[fn2]
The agreement provided that the monthly payments were to
continue until certain specified events. The only terminating
event relevant to this litigation was to occur when all of the
children became "emancipated according to law." The record is
silent as to what the parties intended by that phrase. Upon that
event, Richard's payments to Judy would cease to include child
support and would equal thirty percent of his annual gross earned
income. The agreement also obligated Richard to pay the
children's educational and related expenses. Finally, it declared
that any "dispute or misunderstanding arising under this
[a]greement as to the meaning,
Page 420
interpretation, application or performance of any provision of
this [a]greement . . . shall be submitted to the Middlesex
Probate and Family Court if the parties are unable to resolve the
question by mutual agreement."
When the youngest child, Elizabeth, turned eighteen on April 1,
1987, Richard unilaterally decreased the amount of his monthly
payments to Judy to one-twelfth of thirty percent of his annual
gross earned income, which had by then been much diminished as a
result of his voluntary reduction of the level of his medical
practice. On August 24, 1987, Judy filed a complaint for contempt
alleging that Richard's reduction in payments as of April 1,
1987, and each month thereafter violated the divorce judgment.
It was "apparent that Richard's reduction in support payments
was pursuant to the emancipation clause of the agreement."
Larson v. Larson, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 338, 339 n. 1 (1990)
(Larson I). Richard appears to have implicitly adopted the
position that Elizabeth's eighteenth birthday on April 1, 1987,
had triggered the support termination provision of the agreement
and that the monthly child support obligation had thereupon
ceased.[fn3] Inexplicably, however, neither party referred to or
relied upon the agreement in the course of the proceedings on
Judy's 1987 complaint for contempt. Instead, they tried the case
on the single legal theory that G.L.c. 208, § 28, governed Judy's
entitlement to child support.[fn4] Richard submitted as the
outcome-determinative issue
Page 421
that Judy failed to satisfy one of the two statutory standards
authorizing the court to order support for a child between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one, namely, whether Elizabeth was
"principally dependent" upon her for maintenance. See Larson I,
supra at 339-341.
The judge disagreed with Richard and found for Judy on the
"sole question" whether Elizabeth was "principally dependent"
upon her. Id. at 340.[fn5] On the first appeal, in addition to
criticizing the judge's application of G.L.c. 208, § 28, Richard
advanced a contention not made below: "that the judge erred in
determining that Elizabeth was not `emancipated according to law'
as provided in the separation agreement . . . [because] under
Massachusetts law a child becomes emancipated upon attaining the
age of eighteen years." Larson I, supra at 340.
This court, however, rejected Richard's belated new argument in
Larson I. We observed that the case had been tried below solely
on the theory of the applicability of G.L.c. 208, § 28, reminded
Richard of the settled principle that the theory of law on which
by assent a case is tried cannot be disregarded when the case
comes before an appellate court for review, and stated
unambiguously that "[w]e, therefore, do not consider the question
whether Elizabeth was emancipated as matter of law upon attaining
the age of eighteen." Larson I, supra at 341. We affirmed the
contempt judgment on the issue of principal dependency under
G.L.c. 208, § 28, and authorized Judy to file a petition for
appellate costs and fees.
2. The present proceedings. On April 1, 1990, when Elizabeth,
then a college junior, became twenty-one, Richard again curtailed
his child support payments, without explanation. On May 29, 1990,
Judy filed a new complaint for contempt for the full amounts of
the April and May, 1990, payments.[fn6]
Page 422
Richard, who had by that time left Massachusetts to reside in
Maine, was personally served on June 13, 1990, with copies of the
complaint and the summons, which ordered him to appear at the
Probate Court at 9:00 A.M. on August 1, 1990. At some point in
early June, 1990, Richard's then attorney also received copies of
these documents from Judy's attorney.
Meanwhile, Judy, acting pursuant to the authorization of
Larson I, supra at 343-344, had filed a petition with this
court for counsel fees and costs in connection with the first
appeal on May 24, 1990. Though given a reasonable time to respond
to the petition, Richard failed to do so, and neither he nor his
counsel appeared at the scheduled June 26, 1990, hearing on the
petition. On June 26, 1990, Richard was ordered by this court to
pay Judy $9,193.57 as counsel fees and costs on or before July
26, 1990. The order further provided that "[a]ny proceedings
necessary to enforce payment are to be brought in the Probate
Court." On July 27, 1990, Judy, having heard nothing from either
Richard or his counsel, amended her complaint for contempt by
adding claims for his failure to pay the fees and costs awarded
by this court, as well as for his continued failure to make
$2,600 payments for June and July, 1990.
At the appointed August 1, 1990, contempt hearing before the
Probate Court, neither Richard nor his counsel was present. No
answer had been served to either the original or the amended
complaint, nor was any motion for continuance filed. The judge
found Richard in contempt and ordered him to pay Judy $27,083.79
in arrears, interest, and attorney's fees.[fn7] This judgment
finally stirred Richard to action. On August 10, 1990, his then
counsel filed motions for a new trial and for relief from the
August 1, 1990, judgment, pursuant to Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 59(a),
60(b)(4), and 60(b)(6) (1975). The sole ground for these motions
was the assertion
Page 423
that the contempt judgment was void because the Probate Court
lacked jurisdiction to enter any support orders with respect to a
nondisabled child over the age of twenty-one. Accompanying the
motions was an affidavit of Richard's then counsel attempting to
explain the failure to appear at the August 1, 1990, hearing on
the basis of the counsel's emergency surgery just before the
hearing, his inability to contact Richard following receipt of
Judy's May 29, 1990, complaint, and a failed effort to negotiate
a continuance with Judy's counsel on the eve of the hearing.[fn8]
On August 22, 1990, the judge held a hearing on Richard's
motions. Richard appeared personally and by new counsel. His new
attorney elaborated the lack of jurisdiction argument by
propounding the theory that Judy was estopped by the prior
proceedings to assert the applicability of the separation
agreement, or to deny G.L.c. 208, § 28, as the sole basis for the
Probate Court's jurisdiction. Since that statute conferred power
to make support orders only as to children between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one and since the parties' youngest child was
concededly over twenty-one, counsel argued that Richard was
entitled to relief or a new trial on the ground of "mistake of
law . . . [namely] the entry of a judgment without jurisdiction.
It is our position that under Section 28, this court cannot make
an order for a [nondisabled] child over the age of twenty-one. .
. ."
The judge questioned Richard at the August 22, 1990, hearing as
to his reasons for not appearing or taking any action earlier.
Richard testified, inconsistently with his former counsel's
affidavit, that he had in fact discussed matters with his former
counsel after reviewing Judy's May, 1990, complaint and was told
by counsel that he did not have to appear. The judge also
received an affidavit from Judy's attorney materially
contradicting the affidavit of Richard's former
Page 424
counsel regarding the events surrounding that counsel's late July
request for a stipulated continuance. With all this in hand, the
judge denied Richard's motions (later recalling that he simply
did not believe Richard's explanation for his nonappearance).
Richard took a timely appeal from the denials and from the August
1, 1990, contempt judgment on August 24, 1990.
Judy then filed a second complaint for contempt, on August 29,
1990, alleging that Richard had failed to pay $15,290.22 of the
$27,083.79 due under the August 1, 1990, contempt judgment. This
time Richard answered, repeating his contention that the court's
August orders were void as matter of law for want of
jurisdiction, and also filed a motion to stay all proceedings
until the determination of his pending appeal. At a September 26,
1990, hearing on Judy's second complaint and Richard's stay
motion, Richard's counsel reiterated his previous position that
Judy "is estopped from denying it's anything but a [G.L.c. 208]
Section 28 case, and that the case turned on the relatively
narrow issue of whether you [the judge] exceeded your authority
in ordering support for a child over the age of twenty-one."
The judge denied Richard's stay motion, adjudged him in
contempt, and ordered him to pay Judy $18,590.22, an amount
Richard conceded he was able to pay.[fn9] Richard appealed from
this judgment of contempt and obtained from a single justice of
this court a stay of proceedings on both outstanding judgments
pending resolution of his appeals.
3. The Probate Court's jurisdiction. Richard's entire
argument on appeal depends upon the success of his proposition
that the Probate Court's judgments are void as matter of law
because the court lacked jurisdiction to order support once
Elizabeth turned twenty-one.[fn10] Richard correctly states that
Page 425
a Probate Court judge has no authority under G.L.c. 208, § 28, to
make support orders for a child over twenty-one. He then insists
that the court's only jurisdiction in this case was provided by
that statute, leaving it without any basis to order support for a
child such as Elizabeth.
Without citing or discussing Kotler v. Spaulding,
24 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 517-520 (1987), Richard implicitly acknowledges
that, where a divorce judgment provides by its terms for child
support past the age of twenty-one, the Probate Court retains the
power to enforce the provision through contempt orders. He
contends, however, that the parties' agreement here is no longer
a source of jurisdiction, despite its express bestowal of
jurisdiction on the Probate Court over disputes as to its meaning
and application. Judy is barred from resort to the agreement, he
maintains, by the doctrines of claim preclusion, issue
preclusion, and judicial estoppel. He asserts that Larson I
operates as res judicata, precluding Judy from relying on the
agreement, because she has waived her rights to child support
pursuant to the agreement. The alleged waiver consisted of
allowing the earlier litigation to proceed solely on the basis of
G.L.c. 208, § 28.
Page 426
Richard's argument[fn11] is without merit. The contention that
Judy waived reliance on the agreement ignores the determinative
fact that this appeal does not deal with the same claims, issues,
or arguments as did Larson I. That decision announced, as
emphatically as could be done, that it did not address the
agreement, let alone consider the meaning or application of the
term "emancipated according to law." Larson I, supra at 341.
a. Claim preclusion. This doctrine, traditionally known as
merger or bar, prohibits the maintenance of any action based on
the same claim that was the subject of and was decided in an
earlier action between the parties or their privies. Heacock v.
Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23 (1988). Bagley v. Moxley,
407 Mass. 633, 636-637 (1990). It has no application to the instant
matter because the contempt judgments appealed from constituted
new claims based on different facts from those at issue in
Larson I.
The original contempt judgment that gave rise to Larson I,
dated September 30, 1988, involved claims for violation of the
divorce judgment's monthly payment obligations through that date
only, as did the Larson I opinion. The judgments at issue in
the present appeal cover claims for subsequent payment
violations, from April through September, 1990. These later
violations were not and could not have been raised in the
original action because the times for payment had not yet
occurred or given rise to any cause of action in favor of Judy.
Each violation of Richard's continuing monthly payment obligation
under the divorce judgment constituted a new claim
Page 427
for preclusion purposes, as with any contract calling for
continuous separate performances over a period of time or for
payment of money in separate installments. See Dunbar v.
Dunbar, 180 Mass. 170, 173 (1901), aff'd, 190 U.S. 340 (1903);
Phelps v. Shawprint, Inc., 328 Mass. 352, 356-358 (1952); 18
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4409, at
77-78 n. 11 (1981); 4 Corbin, Contracts §§ 948, 949, & 956
(1951). Accordingly, the doctrine of claim preclusion cannot
provide a basis for Richard's jurisdictional argument.
b. Issue preclusion. This modern term for collateral estoppel
prevents relitigation of an issue of fact or law determined in an
earlier action when the same issue arises in a later proceeding,
even though based on a different claim, between the parties or
their privies. Heacock, supra at 23 n. 2. The central
requirements are that the issue sought to be foreclosed was
actually litigated and was essential to the decision in the prior
action. See Cousineau v. Laramee, 388 Mass. 859, 863 n. 4
(1983); Moat v. Ducharme, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 753 (1990).
Neither of these prerequisites obtains here. Larson I dealt
exclusively with the propriety and sufficiency of the judge's
finding that Elizabeth was "principally dependent" upon Judy
under G.L.c. 208, § 28. No issue relating to the agreement was
litigated or essential to the rulings in that prior action;
indeed, they were expressly disavowed by both courts as a basis
for their decisions. The prior action concerned Richard's support
obligation to a child between eighteen and twenty-one; the
present claim involves his obligation to a child over twenty-one.
Issue preclusion has no application here.
c. Judicial estoppel. This term appears to describe the
doctrine that a party who has maintained one position in a legal
proceeding may not, in a subsequent proceeding between the same
parties, assume a contrary or inconsistent position, at least
when the prior position has been acted or relied upon by an
adverse party. While this basic principle seems to be recognized
in Massachusetts, see Brown v.
Page 428
Quinn, 406 Mass. 641, 646 (1990), application of the doctrine
would be inappropriate here because Judy has not taken contrary
positions in the two lawsuits. It is perfectly consistent for her
to have argued, in the prior case, that Elizabeth was principally
dependent upon her for support, as defined by G.L.c. 208, § 28,
and to argue, in the present action, that Richard remains bound
to pay child support pursuant to the agreement. Cf. Turner v.
McCune, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 864, 865 (1976) (emancipation is not
automatic upon reaching the age of majority). Compare Brown v.
Quinn, supra at 646 (argument that an appeal was premature
estopped because it contradicted party's earlier position that
judgment appealed from was final). Until Elizabeth turned
twenty-one, Judy in fact had no occasion or necessity to resort
to the agreement, since G.L.c. 208, § 28, provided a sufficient
alternative basis to enforce Richard's support obligations.
In summary, Richard's res judicata arguments are inapposite.
The Probate Court had ample sources of authority, including the
agreement, to act on Judy's complaint, and its judgments were
therefore not void for want of jurisdiction.
4. Other arguments. Richard's only contention on appeal not
founded on his unsuccessful jurisdictional points is directed to
the judge's alleged abuse of discretion is denying his rule 59(a)
motion for a new trial. He presents, however, no reasoned
analysis of the circumstances constituting the alleged abuse.
Richard's cursory, three-sentence presentation does not assist
the court with meaningful citation of authority and cannot be
said to rise to the level of acceptable appellate argument under
Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975). See
Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass. 10, 13-14 (1958); Hastoupis v.
Gargas, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 39 (1980). Richard's position with
respect to the judge's refusal to grant him relief from the
August 1, 1990, judgment under rule 60(b) makes no mention of any
abuse of discretion by the judge. Rather, it rests entirely on
the court's supposed lack of jurisdiction and consequent voidness
of its judgments. Given the inconsistent statements of Richard
and his attorney
Page 429
as to the purported reasons for their failures to answer or
appear at the August 1, 1990, hearing, as well as the conflicting
affidavits of counsel regarding the background of the
nonappearance, there was no abuse of discretion in the judge's
denial of Richard's motions in any event. Deference is
particularly due the judge's exercise of discretion because of
his lengthy involvement in the proceeding. Burger Chef Sys.,
Inc. v. Servfast of Brockton, Inc., 393 Mass. 287, 289
(1984).[fn12]
5. Costs and fees on appeal. Both parties have requested an
award of counsel fees and costs in connection with this appeal.
Richard's appeal having failed, he is not entitled to them.
Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 20 (1989). Richard has
conceded his ability to pay any judgments issued and is in a
financial position to defray the costs of this appeal superior to
that of Judy, who has prevailed. Judy was awarded fees and costs
not only for the first appeal but also for the two 1990 contempt
proceedings in the Probate Court, which awards Richard does not
here contest. Therefore, as in the prior appeal, Judy may submit
to this court a motion for counsel fees within thirty days after
issuance of our rescript, in accordance with the procedural
requirements of Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, supra at 20. See
Larson I, supra at 343-344.
Judgments affirmed.
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.
[fn1] Richard filed two separate notices of appeal: one on August
24, 1990, from the August 1, 1990, contempt judgment and the
August 22, 1990, denials of his motions for new trial and relief
from that judgment; and the other taken on September 28, 1990,
from a judgment of contempt entered September 26, 1990. The
Probate Court combined the two appeals in its assembly of the
record, and both appeals were entered as one case on the docket
of this court.
[fn2] By January, 1987, the monthly payments had been adjusted
upward, by a formula in the agreement, to $2,600, where they
appear to have remained as of the date of this appeal.
[fn3] General Laws c. 231, § 85P, as inserted by St. 1975, c.
315, § 1, declares that any person eighteen years old "shall for
all purposes . . . be deemed of full legal capacity. . . ."
General Laws c. 4, § 7, cl. fifty-first, defines "age of
majority" as eighteen years of age. Neither party has cited to
these statutes. No statute appears to define "emancipation." It
is clear that there is no fixed age when emancipation occurs; it
does not automatically occur on reaching the age of majority.
Turner v. McCune, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 864, 865 (1976).
[fn4] General Laws c. 208, § 28, as amended through St. 1976, c.
279, § 1, provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court may make
appropriate orders of maintenance, support and education of any
child who has attained age eighteen but who has not attained age
twenty-one and who is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is
principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance."
[fn5] The judge found Richard in contempt on September 30, 1988,
and ordered him to pay Judy $33,524.29, consisting of $24,674.00
in arrears, $3,284.55 in interest, and $5,565.74 in costs and
attorneys' fees.
[fn6] Richard had additionally failed to make a payment for the
month of October, 1988, which Judy also sought in her May 29,
1990, complaint.
[fn7] This amount represented $24,793.57 in arrears, $268.57 in
interest, and $2,021.65 in attorneys' fees.
[fn8] Judy's attorney had been willing to assent to a continuance
of the August 1 hearing on the condition that Richard pay the
undisputed amounts he owed Judy (the $2,600 for October, 1988,
support and the $9,193.57 in fees and costs for Larson I) on or
before August 1, 1990. No agreement ensued because Richard failed
to make those payments as requested, although he did pay them at
the August 22, 1990, hearing on his motions.
[fn9] The components of this sum were the $15,290.22 from the
August 1, 1990, judgment, plus a $2,600 payment for September,
1990, and $700 for attorneys' fees. Judy's counsel had sought
$2,944.10 in attorneys' fees and costs.
[fn10] Richard does not argue here what would objectively appear
to be the only substantial point to be litigated in this case,
namely, whether he should be relieved of his support obligation
because Elizabeth has become "emancipated according to law"; nor
does he assign as error anything done by the judge that rejected
such an argument or prevented him from making such an argument
below. Instead, he asserts that, "[b]ecause the original contempt
[in Larson I] was pre-tried, tried and decided on appeal as a
Section 28 proceeding, traditional views of emancipation and the
factors employed to determine whether it has occurred were not
then and are not now applicable to the facts of the case." Both
Judy's May 24, 1990, contempt complaint and July 27, 1990,
amended contempt complaint alleged the continued applicability of
Richard's obligation to make monthly support payments "until the
youngest child is emancipated according to law." Although Richard
was not deemed to have admitted these averments by his failure to
deny them in a responsive pleading (there is no rule in the
domestic relations rules corresponding to Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(d),
365 Mass. 750 (1974); see Kindregan & Inker, Family Law & Practice §
184, at 267 [1990]), and although Richard's September 24, 1990,
answer did deny the same allegation contained in Judy's August
29, 1990, contempt complaint and averred further that "the claim
for child support is barred by the child's emancipation and her
having obtained the age of 21," he did not, as noted above,
subsequently press or argue this point, but rather appears to
have expressly abandoned it.
[fn11] Richard did not affirmatively set forth estoppel or res
judicata as defenses in his answer to Judy's August, 1990,
contempt complaint, as required by Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 8(c) (1975);
nor did he raise them in arguing against the judgment on her May,
1990, contempt complaint or her July, 1990, amended contempt
complaint, which he never answered, contrary to Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P.
7(a) & 8(b) (1975). The judge nonetheless allowed Richard to
present his jurisdictional argument during the hearings below,
without objection from Judy, so the failure to plead was not
fatal. Compare Brash v. Brash, 407 Mass. 101, 104 n. 4
(1990); Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 368 n. 3
(1985). In any event, since the issues may recur as to future
monthly payment obligations, we would choose to discuss them in
the interest of judicial economy.
[fn12] Since each monthly payment obligation under the agreement
gives rise to a separate claim, see the discussion in part 3a,
supra at 11-12, Richard remains free to raise any arguments he
may have against enforcement of that agreement in a future
proceeding, including whether Elizabeth has become "emancipated
according to law." This court is unable to make such a
determination on the present record, because the issue was not
briefed or argued either before the Probate Court or on appeal.