If one can commit plagiarism without intent can one be found guilty of plagiarism?
Full Question:
Answer:
Yes, a person may be found guilty of plagiarism if one did not intend to or knowingly attempt to steal anothers ideas or pass another's work off as one's own. In the school setting, it is generally a matter of internal administrative decision-making. While the school may have applicable guidelines to follow in disciplinary matters, it often is a matter of subjective determination. It is more of an administrative than a legal matter. Typically, the courts will review such cases only insofar as ensuring that due process rights were afforded to the student in the disciplinary procedures. This will involve such considerations as whether the student was served with a written notice of charges; she was made aware of grounds which would justify her expulsion or suspension by way of the student handbook; the hearing tribunal afforded her
an opportunity to hear and confront the evidence presented against her and an opportunity to be heard and to offer other evidence if she chose; she was accorded the right to have someone
from the college community to assist her in the proceedings; she was informed of the tribunal's finding; she was given access to its decision for her personal review; and, she was advised in writing of the discipline imposed.
Please see the following NY cases:
MATTER OF KALINSKY v. STATE UNIV. OF NEW YORK, 214 A.D.2d 860 [3d Dept 1995]
624 N.Y.S.2d 679
In the Matter of DEBORAH KALINSKY, Appellant, v. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW
YORK AT BINGHAMTON, Respondent.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department.
April 20, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Broome County (Mugglin, J.).
Peters, J.
On a previous appeal involving this matter (Matter of Kalinsky
v State University of N.Y., 161 A.D.2d 1006), we affirmed so much
of the judgment of Supreme Court that annulled respondent's
determination finding petitioner guilty
Page 861
of plagiarism, yet modified such judgment by remitting the matter
to respondent for a new disciplinary hearing. Upon remittal,
petitioner was once again found to have committed plagiarism.
Petitioner appealed this determination to respondent's Dean of
Arts and Sciences, who notified petitioner by letter dated June
5, 1991 that she concurred with the determination below and
therefore denied petitioner's administrative appeal. A copy of
this determination was sent to petitioner's counsel on August 7,
1991.
On October 3, 1991, petitioner commenced a proceeding pursuant
to CPLR article 78 seeking to annul such determination on due
process grounds. That petition was dismissed by this Court as
jurisdictionally defective (Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of
N Y, 188 A.D.2d 810, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 711). This proceeding
was then commenced on December 5, 1991 and respondent sought the
dismissal of such proceeding as untimely. Petitioner contended
that while she received a determination on or about June 5, 1991,
her counsel was not served until August 7, 1991 and therefore the
four-month Statute of Limitations did not begin to run until her
counsel was properly served. Supreme Court rejected such
contention and found the proceeding time barred. Upon
reconsideration, Supreme Court adhered to its original decision.
In cases of disciplinary proceedings for misconduct at
tax-supported institutions of higher education, we have adopted
the precepts set forth in Dixon v Alabama State Bd. of Educ.
(294 F.2d 150, cert denied 368 U.S. 930). "`Whenever a
governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the
Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due process
of law. The minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfy
due process depend upon the circumstances and the interests of
the parties involved'" (Matter of Mary M. v Clark, 100 A.D.2d 41,
43, quoting Dixon v Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra, at 155).
Even acknowledging respondent's contention that a student has no
right to representation by counsel at a State university
disciplinary proceeding (see, Matter of Mary M. v Clark,
supra), we find that "once counsel has appeared in a matter a
Statute of Limitations or time requirement cannot begin to run
unless that counsel is served with the determination or the order
or judgment sought to be reviewed" (Matter of Bianca v Frank,
43 N.Y.2d 168, 173).
Here, it is clear from the record that since the institution of
these charges in January 1988, petitioner appeared with counsel.
Throughout all phases of this proceeding, the university either
communicated directly with counsel for petitioner
Page 862
or copied counsel on each and every letter written. Petitioner's
counsel was not only notified of the scheduling of the hearing,
but was also successful in his attempt to have a member of the
committee recused and replaced. Respondent further requested a
witness list from petitioner's counsel, advised him that
additional documents would be made available, and was advised by
copy of the adverse decision of the committee that petitioner
would be entitled to appeal the determination to the Dean of Arts
and Sciences.
In pursuit of such appeal, petitioner notified the Dean that
she would like to appear with counsel and further requested the
Dean to provide counsel, as well as herself, with "notice of any
opportunity we are given to be heard". The letter was
acknowledged by the Dean by letter to petitioner indicating that,
after meeting with her and her counsel and reviewing the
additional materials submitted by counsel, the appeal was denied.
However, the record contains no explanation as to why, in this
instance only, petitioner's counsel was not copied on such
determination.
Unlike the situation in Matter of Lower E. Side Community Dev.
Corp. v City of New York Div. of Real Prop. (170 A.D.2d 296, lv
denied 78 N.Y.2d 857), where the petitioner failed to demonstrate,
or even allege, that it had representation by counsel on the
matter, we find that petitioner consistently made it clear that
she was represented by counsel and that such representation was
acknowledged by respondent. We further find this matter clearly
distinguishable from Matter of Weeks v State of New York
(198 A.D.2d 615), where we refused to recognize a union representative
who is not an attorney when addressing the commencement of the
limitations period when the award was delivered to the union
representing the petitioner as opposed to the petitioner
personally. Here, in finding that petitioner's counsel was deemed
to act as her agent in all respects throughout this proceeding,
with such representation duly acknowledged by respondent,
documents determining legal rights had to be "served on the
attorney the party has chosen to handle the matter on [her]
behalf. This is not simply a matter of courtesy and fairness; it
is the traditional and accepted practice which has been all but
universally codified" (Matter of Bianca v Frank, supra, at
173). Accordingly, we conclude that the period of limitations in
the instant matter must be computed from August 7, 1991, the time
that notice was served upon petitioner's counsel, and that based
thereon the proceeding was timely commenced (see, CPLR 217
[1]).
Page 863
The judgment and order of Supreme Court are hereby reversed and
the matter is remitted for a determination on the merits.
Mikoll, J.P., Mercure, Crew III and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment and order are reversed, on the law,
with costs, and respondent's motion to dismiss the petition is
denied.
MATTER OF TRAHMS v. TRUSTEES, COLUMBIA UNIV., 245 A.D.2d 124 [1st Dept 1997]
666 N.Y.S.2d 150
In the Matter of WILLIAM TRAHMS, Respondent, v. TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Appellants.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department.
December 16, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Sheila Abdus-Salaam, J.).
Page 125
Petitioner William Trahms was expelled in December 1994 from
respondent Columbia University School of Nursing on the ground of
his having committed plagiarism. After a meeting on December 2,
1994 between petitioner, another student and two professors
concerning the strong similarities between the two students'
papers, the professors informed both students that the matter
would be referred to the School's Honor Board. Petitioner was
given four days oral notice by the Dean that a hearing would be
held before the Honor Board on the plagiarism charge, and that he
had the right to call witnesses on his behalf Petitioner appeared
at the hearing and vigorously challenged the plagiarism charge.
However, based on findings that the papers submitted by the
students were virtually identical, that petitioner was unfamiliar
with his own work and that many of his statements were
inconsistent with those of his own witnesses, the Honor Board
concluded that petitioner had not submitted original work and
recommended a failing grade and dismissal from the school. His
appeal to the School's Appeals Board was rejected.
Petitioner commenced the instant article 78 proceeding seeking
a judgment vacating his dismissal. The IAS Court granted the
petition to the extent of remanding the matter to respondents for
a de novo hearing, which hearing was to be recorded verbatim. The
court ruled that the Honor Board's determination must be vacated
because petitioner had not received adequate notice of the
hearing and charges.
We disagree and find, to the contrary, that petitioner received
adequate notice of the hearing and charges against him.
Respondents substantially complied with their published
guidelines in the instant case (see, Matter of Mu Ch. of Delta
Kappa Epsilon v. Colgate Univ., 176 A.D.2d 11, 14; see also, Matter
of Harris v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 62 N.Y.2d 956, 959, revg
98 A.D.2d 58). Petitioner appeared at the hearing on the correct
date, he orally confirmed at its commencement that he had been
given notice of the hearing and charges and he profferred a
defense, which included the testimony of two witnesses. These
facts convincingly prove that petitioner suffered
Page 126
no prejudice due to the allegedly inadequate notice (cf., Matter
of Weidemann v. State Univ., 188 A.D.2d 974, 975-976).
We also disagree with the IAS Court that a verbatim recording
of the Honor Board hearing was required (see, Matter of Gruen v.
Chase, 215 A.D.2d 481; Matter of Mary M. v. Clark, 100 A.D.2d 41, 43;
see also, Matter of Girsky v. Touro Coll., 210 A.D.2d 406, 407).
The record, as it now stands, is adequate for judicial review.