If a 17 Year Old is Pregnant and lives on her on is the parent required to pay child support?
Full Question:
Answer:
Missouri courts have stated that emancipation occurs when a minor child is freed from the care, custody, control and service of her parents. This is generally accomplished when there is a relinquishment of parental control, the child is given the right to receive and retain her own
earnings, and the parent's legal obligation to support her is terminated. "Emancipation is never presumed, and the burden is upon the party asserting it to show facts proving the emancipation." Randolph v. Randolph, 8 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999). "A minor child may be emancipated in one of three ways: (1) by express parental consent, (2) by implied parental consent, or (3) by a change of the child's status in the eyes of society." Denton v. Sims, 884 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo.App.E.D. 1994). The third category usually refers to a child who has married or joined the military. "However, it may also be shown when a child who is physically and mentally able to care for herself voluntarily chooses to leave the parental home and attempts to `fight the battle of life on [her] own account.'" Id. (quoting Specking v. Specking, 528 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Mo.App. 1975) (quoting Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo. App. 657,
136 S.W. 18 (1911)).
nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child." Section 452.370.4. "The purpose of this statutory provision is to `make it absolute' that unless there are contrary provisions in the dissolution decree or the separation agreement, the child support obligation ends upon the child's emancipation and does not automatically continue during the child's
minority." Ragan v. Ragan, 931 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Mo.App.S.D. 1996) (quoting Bushell v. Schepp, 613 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Mo.App.E.D. 1981)).
The following is a Missouri case:
WURTH v. WURTH, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.banc 1959)
MARIAN WURTH, BY HARRY GERSHENSON, HER NEXT FRIEND, APPELLANT, v. JOHN S.
WURTH, RESPONDENT.
No. 47070.
Supreme Court of Missouri.
En Banc.
March 9, 1959.
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1959.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, JOHN C. CASEY,
J.
Harry Gershenson, St. Louis for appellant.
Rene J. Lusser, Lusser, Morris & Burns, St. Louis, for
respondent.
WESTHUES, Judge.
[1] Plaintiff Marian Wurth, by Harry Gershenson, her next friend,
filed this suit against her father, defendant John S. Wurth, to
recover $25,000 as damages for personal injuries alleged to have
been sustained through the negligence of the defendant. A trial
before a jury resulted in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of
$5,700. The trial court sustained defendant's motion to set aside
the verdict and to enter judgment for the defendant. From the
judgment entered, plaintiff appealed to the St. Louis Court of
Appeals which court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Mo.App., 313 S.W.2d 161. This court ordered the case transferred
here for determination.
[2] The trial court set aside the verdict for plaintiff and
entered a judgment for the defendant on the theory that plaintiff
was a minor and had not been emancipated at the time she was
injured and that therefore she could not maintain a suit in tort
against her father. That is the principal question briefed and
the point for our determination
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is whether the evidence was
sufficient to support a finding that plaintiff had been
emancipated. The question was submitted to a jury and by the
verdict it found for the plaintiff.
[3] Defendant, in the brief, did not question the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain a finding that plaintiff was injured as a
result of his negligence. A brief statement of the evidence
therefore will be sufficient. Plaintiff was, on January 9, 1953,
employed by the Bell Telephone Company and worked at the office
located at 2317 South Grand Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri. On the
morning of that day, defendant, as was his habit, took plaintiff
to work. The streets were icy in spots and some streets were
pretty well covered with ice. Plaintiff admonished defendant not
to drive so fast because of the icy condition. Shortly
thereafter, the car went into a spin and struck a lamp post.
Plaintiff was thrown from the car and was injured. This suit was
filed to recover damages to compensate her for her injuries.
[4] Plaintiff's evidence to sustain her claim that she had been
emancipated supports the following statement of facts: Plaintiff,
when 19 years of age, began to work for the Bell Telephone
Company. This was about a year and a half before she was injured.
Plaintiff retained her wages and paid for her clothing, her
medical and doctor bills, paid her parents for board and room,
and, in general, paid all of her own bills. After she was
injured, she paid the hospital bills, one of which amounted to
$327.45. She had not paid all of the expenses incurred by reason
of the injuries she received, but she was personally obligated to
pay for them. There was no evidence that plaintiff's parents paid
for any of her needs after plaintiff started working at the Bell
Telephone Company nor is there any evidence that the parents
assumed any obligation on her behalf after plaintiff began
working.
[5] The defendant offered no evidence and it may be inferred that
the parents acquiesced and agreed that plaintiff should retain
all of her wages and pay her own way.
[6] Defendant, in the first point briefed, asserts that the trial
court ruled correctly in entering judgment for defendant because
an unemancipated minor cannot sue his parents by reason of an
unintentional tort. We may concede that to be the rule. We so
held in a case cited by the defendant where the question was
reviewed at some length. Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29.
[7] Defendant also says in another point that the burden of proof
rests upon the party asserting emancipation, in this case, the
plaintiff. That may also be conceded to be the correct rule.
Beebe v. Kansas City, 223 Mo.App. 642, 17 S.W.2d 608, loc.cit.
612(9, 10); 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 90, p. 816.
[8] Defendant, in briefing the principal question before us, says
that the trial court ruled correctly in entering judgment for the
defendant because "there was a failure of proof, by competent,
credible and sufficient evidence that plaintiff was a completely
emancipated minor on the date of her casualty." As to the quantum
of proof necessary to establish voluntary emancipation, we note
and quote excerpts from 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 88, pp.
812-814, as follows: "The intention of the parent to emancipate
the child may be expressed either in writing or orally, or it may
be implied from his conduct or from other circumstances. * * *
Emancipation may also be implied by the parent's acquiescence in
his child's working for others, receiving its pay therefor, and
spending the money as it pleases." It may be noted that,
generally speaking, the parents must consent or agree that a
minor child be emancipated and unless the parents so give their
consent, the child retains the status of an unemancipated minor.
[9] Plaintiff in this case sued her father, the defendant, on the
theory that she had been emancipated. Plaintiff offered
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evidence
to sustain her claims, the substance of which we have heretofore
stated. In our opinion, the facts proven are sufficient to
sustain a finding that plaintiff had been emancipated. The
evidence of plaintiff was not contradicted by any circumstance or
any evidence of the defendant.
[10] The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut had before it a
case very similar to the one before us in Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280,
63 A.2d 586. The plaintiff in that case sued her father in a
personal injury action alleging that she had been injured through
her father's negligent operation of a car in which she was a
passenger. Her evidence as to emancipation was about the same as
plaintiff's evidence in the case at bar. There is this
difference: in the Wood case, the minor did not pay her parents
anything for her board while in the case at bar, the plaintiff
did pay board. This fact, we think makes a stronger case for
Marian Wurth than for plaintiff in the Wood case. The Connecticut
court, in the course of the opinion, 63 A.2d loc.cit. 588(4),
said, "These facts afford strong support for an inference of
emancipation, as is shown by many authorities, of which we
mention but a few. (Citation of cases omitted.) These authorities
indicate that as a general rule the fact that a child has entered
into a relation which is inconsistent with the idea of his being
in a subordinate situation in his parent's family is sufficient
to effect an emancipation. 39 Am.Jur. 704."
[11] In the case of Zozaski v. Mather Stock Car Co., 312 Ill.App.
585, 38 N.E.2d 825, the evidence as to emancipation was that a
minor son employed by the defendant company had paid board and
room at his home and paid all of his own bills and that neither
his father nor his mother contributed in any way to his support
or maintenance. The court held the son was emancipated. 38 N.E.2d
loc.cit. 826(2-4).
[12] The opinions in the Connecticut and Illinois cases disclose
that the court in each case considered cases from other
jurisdictions and cited such cases as supporting their decisions.
The general rule is that the question of emancipation under
conflicting evidence is for a jury. Wood v. Wood, supra,
63 A.2d 588(6, 7). Missouri cases have followed that rule. Brosius v.
Barker, 154 Mo.App. 657, 136 S.W. 18; McMorrow v. Dowell, 116
Mo.App. 289, 90 S.W. 728; Dierker, to Use of Shoemake v. Hess, 54
Mo. 246.
[13] Defendant cited the case of Swenson v. Swenson, Mo.App.,
227 S.W.2d 103, 20 A.L.R.2d 1409. That case involved the question of
whether a minor is emancipated by enlisting in the military
service with the consent of his parents. The Court of Appeals
said he was. In the case of Beebe v. Kansas City, supra, a father
sued the defendant for damages sustained by his son. One of the
defenses presented on appeal was that the son had been
emancipated. The Court of Appeals held that in such cases
emancipation, if relied on as a defense, must be pleaded; that it
was not so pleaded, and therefore the defendant could not take
advantage of such a defense. The court commented that the consent
of a father that his son should retain his wages was but a
license and could be revoked. 17 S.W.2d loc.cit. 612(9, 10). The
question of emancipation was not presented as an issue in the
case.
[14] We rule that the evidence in the case before us justified the
submission of emancipation to a jury. The jury found this issue
for the plaintiff.
[15] The order of the trial court sustaining defendant's motion to
set aside the verdict and judgment in plaintiff's favor and to
enter a judgment for the defendant and the order of the trial
court entering a judgment for the defendant are hereby set aside
with directions to the trial court to reinstate the verdict of
the jury and to enter judgment thereon in plaintiff's favor as of
the date of the verdict.
[16] It is so ordered.
Page 748
[17] HOLLINGSWORTH, C. J., and HYDE, STORCKMAN, and DALTON, JJ.,
concur.
[18] EAGER, J., dissents.
[19] LEEDY, J., dissents and adopts opinion of St. Louis Court of
Appeals as his dissenting opinion.