What are the Remedies for Defamation in Idaho?
Full Question:
Answer:
The answer will depend on the facts and circumstances involved, such as whether the statement is true or not. Defamation is an act of communication that causes someone to be shamed, ridiculed, held in contempt, lowered in the estimation of the community, or to lose employment status or earnings or otherwise suffer a damaged reputation. The law of defamation protects a person's reputation and good name against communications that are false and derogatory. Defamation consists of both libel and slander. Libel is any defamation that can be seen, most typically in writing. Slander is an oral defamatory communication. Specific requirements that a plaintiff must prove in order to recover in a defamation action differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Generally, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, that the defendant made an unprivileged publication to a third party, and that the publisher acted at least negligently in publishing the communication. A plaintiff may also be required to prove special damages. Publication certainly includes traditional forms, such as communications included in books, newspapers, and magazines, but it also includes oral remarks. Courts may require that the defendant act with actual malice or act negligently in failing to ascertain whether a statement was false or defamatory.
Damages for libel may be limited to actual damages unless there is malicious intent. It does not have to be proven that actual harm to your reputation occurred to collect damages for libel if it is defamatory per se, such as:
* The communication affects your business, trade or profession (loss of business, discharge, demotion, etc.),
* Implies you committed a crime,
* Leads on that you have a loathsome disease,
* Or suggests that you are somehow sexually impure.
Defamation is a difficult wrong to prove, as there are various factors that are to be taken into consideration. The court must evaluate the defendant’s investigation, or lack there of, concerning the accuracy of the statement. How thoroughly the investigation was handled will reflect upon the nature and interest of the person who communicated the statement. Generally, defamation damages will not be awarded if the defendant had an honest but yet mistaken belief in the truth of the statement.
The amount of damages that can be awarded is a matter of subjective determination for the court, based on all the facts and circumstances in each case. There is case law on defamation in Idaho. An example is provided below. There is no specific timeframe in the law for a person to cease and desist in an action. When there is no specific timeframe stated, the courts will generally imply a "reasonable" timeframe, which is a subjective standard based on how a reasonable person would act in similar circumstances.
Please see the following ID statute:
6-702. Uniform single publication act — One cause of action for
libel or slander — Recovery. —
No person shall have more than one (1) cause of action for
damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other
tort founded upon any single publication or exhibition or
utterance, such as any one (1) edition of a newspaper or book or
magazine or any one (1) presentation to an audience or any one
(1) broadcast over radio or television or any one (1) exhibition
of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all
damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all
jurisdictions.
Please see the following Idaho case:
CLARK v. SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, 144 Idaho 427 (2007)
163 P.3d 216
Trent L. CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Cowles
Publishing Company, William Stacey Cowles, Chris Peck and Thomas Clouse,
Defendants-Respondents.
No. 32565.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
May 24, 2007.
Appeal from the First Judicial District Court, Kootenai
County, Charles Weeks Hosack, J.
Page 428
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
Page 429
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered,
Pocatello, for appellant. Richard Avery Hearn argued.
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., Coeur d'
Alene, for respondents. Duane M. Swinton argued.
BURDICK, Justice.
This case asks us to decide whether there are genuine
issues of material fact on Appellant Trent L. Clark's
defamation claim, thereby rendering summary judgment improper.
This case also asks the Court to decide whether Clark's false
light invasion of privacy tort claim should survive summary
judgment. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on both
claims.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Thomas Clouse co-wrote an article published' by the Spokesman
Review about a potential Republican senatorial candidate, Bob
Nonini, which discussed Nonini's drug arrest, Nonini's
involvement as a government informant for narcotics officers,
and the arrests of one of Nonini's associates. In response,
Appellant Trent L. Clark, as State Chairman of the Republican
Party in Idaho, issued a press release criticizing the
article and supporting Nonini. Clouse then set up and conducted a
telephone interview with Clark to which Paula Garriot, The
Idaho Republican Party Communications Director, was also a
party. Clouse was the only party to take notes during the
interview.
During the course of that interview, Clark expressed his
concern about implying that a 17-year-old dismissed arrest
makes you a "bad person." Clark also made a statement regarding
the arrest and conviction of African American males in
Washington, D.C. In a subsequent article, Clouse quoted Clark
as saying: "You probably cannot find an African American male
on the street in Washington, D.C., that hasn't been arrested or
convicted of a crime." In his pleading, Clark claims he said:
"You probably cannot find an African American male on the
street in Washington, D.C. who doesn't have friends
who have been arrested or convicted of a crime." (Emphasis
added).
As a result, Clark brought this lawsuit against Respondents:
The Spokesman Review, Cowles Publishing Company, William Stacey
Cowles, Chris Peck, and Thomas Clouse (collectively Spokesman
Review), alleging defamation and false light invasion of
privacy. The magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor
of Spokesman Review on both claims, holding that there was no
clear and convincing evidence as to actual malice. The district
court affirmed summary judgment on both claims on the alternate
ground that there were no issues of fact as to falsity. Clark
timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When this Court reviews a case decided in the magistrate
division that has been appealed to the district court, we
review the magistrate's decision independently of, but with due
regard for, the district court's appellate decision. Post
Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 636,
962 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1998). When we review the magistrate
Page 430
court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we employ
the same standard properly employed by the magistrate court
when originally ruling on the motion. Id.
Summary judgment shall be rendered when "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court
liberally construes the entire record in favor of the nonmoving
party and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in
that party's favor. Steele v. Spokesman-Review,
138 Idaho 249, 251, 61 P.3d 606, 608 (2002). If the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, summary judgment
is proper. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Clark argues that summary judgment was improper and that there
are genuine issues of material fact as to the defamatory,
damage, falsity, and actual malice elements of Clark's
defamation claim. Clark also argues that there are genuine
issues of material fact on his false light invasion of privacy
claim. Finally, both parties seek attorney fees on appeal. We
will address the defamation claim first, then the false light
claim before turning to the issue of attorney fees.
A. Defamation
In a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant: (1) communicated information concerning the
plaintiff to others; (2) that the information was defamatory;
and (3) that the plaintiff was damaged because of the
communication. See Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co.,
73 Idaho 173, 177, 249 P.2d 192, 194 (1952). As a fourth element,
when a publication concerns a public official, public figure,
or matters of public concern and there is a media defendant,
the plaintiff must also show the falsity of the statements at
issue in order to prevail in a defamation suit.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
775-76, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 1563-64, 89 L.Ed.2d 783, 791-92 (1986).
Finally, if the plaintiff is a public figure, the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710,
11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), standard applies, and the plaintiff can
recover only if he can prove actual malice, knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of truth, by clear and convincing
evidence. Steele, 138 Idaho at 252, 61 P.3d at 609;
Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 339, 563 P.2d 395,
397 (1977).
Clark contends that the magistrate court erred when it granted
summary judgment because he raised genuine issues of material
fact on his defamation claim. We affirm summary judgment
because Clark failed to produce evidence a jury could find is
clear and convincing proof that Spokesman Review acted with
actual malice. Since he failed on this element, we will not
address the other elements of defamation.
First, however, we will address Spokesman Review's argument
that only evidence Clark brings forward must be viewed in the
light most favorable to him. This Court liberally construes the
entire record in favor of the nonmoving party and "draws
all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that
party's favor." Steele, 138 Idaho at 251,
61 P.3d at 608 (emphasis added); see also Gardner v. Evans,
110 Idaho 925, 929, 719 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1986).
[8-10] Clark is a public figure; hence, the New York
Times standard applies and he will recover only if he can
prove actual malice, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of truth, by clear and convincing evidence. See
Steele, 138 Idaho at 252, 61 P.3d at 609;
Bandelin, 98 Idaho at 339, 563 P.2d at 397. On a
summary judgment motion by a defendant in a defamation action,
the plaintiff must produce evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact and evidence a jury could find is clear and
convincing evidence the defendant acted with "actual
malice."[fn1]
Page 431
Id. "Disputed issues of fact that if resolved in
favor of the plaintiff would still fall short of establishing
malice with convincing clarity are not material."
Bandelin, 98 Idaho at 341, 563 P.2d at 399.
Actual malice is not defined as an evil intent or a motive
arising from spite. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2429,
115 L.Ed.2d 447, 468 (1991). In a defamation action, actual malice is
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth.
Bandelin, 98 Idaho at 339, 563 P.2d at 397. Mere
negligence is insufficient; the plaintiff must demonstrate that
"the author in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication or acted with a high degree of awareness of
. . . probable falsity." Masson, 501 U.S. at 510,
111 S.Ct. at 2429, 115 L.Ed.2d at 468 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The standard of actual malice is a
subjective one. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 575,
790 P.2d 347, 356 (1990) (citing Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688,
109 S.Ct. 2678, 2696, 105 L.Ed.2d 562, 577 (1989) (emphasis
removed and internal quotations omitted)). However, although
actual malice is a subjective standard, self-interested denials
of actual malice from the defendant can be rebutted with other
evidence. This Court focuses on whether there is sufficient
evidence of purposeful avoidance of the truth. Id.
at 576, 790 P.2d at 357.
In Masson, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that
the author engaged in deliberate or reckless falsification.
501 U.S. at 499, 111 S.Ct. at 2424, 115 L.Ed.2d at 461. In that
case, plaintiff's allegations that the published statements were
"false" were supported by tape-recordings of the interviews
between the speaker and the author. Id. at 502,
111 S.Ct. at 2425, 115 L.Ed.2d at 463. Although the defendant
contested allegations that she published the statements with
knowledge or reckless disregard of the alterations, the claim
could not be disposed of on summary judgment. Id.
at 521, 111 S.Ct. at 2435, 115 L.Ed.2d at 475. The Court found
that other than the plaintiff's allegations, "the record
contain[ed] substantial additional evidence . . . which . . .
would support a jury determination under a clear and convincing
standard that [defendant] deliberately or recklessly altered
the quotations." Id. at 521, 111 S.Ct. at 2435,
115 L.Ed.2d at 475.
Clark argues that there is sufficient evidence to find that the
reporter, Clouse, and the editor, Peck, acted with actual
malice.[fn2] As against Peck, Clark has only alleged evidence
regarding his refusal to print a correction. Clark has not
alleged that when the defamatory statement was published, Peck
had the subjective state of mind necessary to satisfy the
actual malice standard and therefore has failed to show actual
malice based on Peck's actions. Thus, he has failed to meet his
burden as against Peck.
As against Clouse, Clark asserts that Clark issued the Idaho
Republican Party press release which was critical of Clouse's
reporting, that Garriot stated Clouse appeared to be "very
offended" by Clark's criticism, that one-third of the interview
centered on a discussion of "guilt by association" and
profiling, that the statement as reported by
Page 432
Clouse was false, and that Clouse understood Clark was not
trying to make a racist statement.
Turning first to falsity, the exact wording of the statement
Clark made in the interview remains unclear. Clouse's
article quotes Clark as follows:
"As Bob tells this story, he is very guilty of a very
serious mistake: He grew up with and was friends with
the wrong crowd," Clark said. "You probably cannot
find an African American male on the street in
Washington, D.C., that hasn't been arrested or
convicted of a crime."
"Of all the evidence you've got, nothing contradicts
what Bob has already confessed to — he hung
around with the wrong crowd."
(Emphasis added).
In his pleadings, Clark asserts the italicized sentence should
have read: "You probably cannot find an African American male
on the street in Washington, D.C. who doesn't have friends who
have been arrested or convicted of a crime." Garriot's request
to the Spokesman Review for a correction, made upon order of
Clark, stated the quote should have read: "You probably cannot
find an African American male on the street in Washington, D.C.
who that [sic] doesn't have friends who have been arrested or
convicted of a crime." In his deposition, Clark stated that he
cannot remember word for word what he said, but that he is
certain he made a reference to friends in that statement. The
parties disagree on whether the statement was taken out of
context, and if so, whether that resulted in falsity.
Nonetheless, even assuming for the purposes of argument that
the published statement was false, Clark still fails to meet
the clear and convincing standard necessary to survive summary
judgment on the issue of actual malice.
None of the evidence indicates that Clouse had knowledge of the
alleged falsity of the statement or that he engaged in reckless
falsification. Clouse said that he was certain a reference to
friends was not part of the quotation and that his certainty
was based both from his notes and his memory. Furthermore, the
statements as published correspond almost exactly with Clouse's
interview notes. Though Clouse stated he agreed the point Clark
was trying to make by his statement was guilt by association
and was not racist, he has no memory of any profiling
discussion. Clouse also stated that he purposely used the
statements made both before and after the quotation at issue to
avoid any inference that he took it out of context. Clark has
not argued that the statements immediately preceding and
following the quotation at issue are inaccurate or misplaced.
All of this evidence shows that when Clouse made the
publication, he subjectively believed the statements to be true
and to be presented in context, and Clark offers no evidence
that sufficiently indicates Clouse had knowledge of the alleged
falsity or entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
publication.
In the face of this evidence, Garriot's perception that Clouse
was "very upset" and "very offended" when he called to set up
an interview with Clark is not clear and convincing proof that
Clouse acted with actual malice. In the defamation context,
actual malice does not mean ill will or spite; there must be
publication with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard
of the truth. The publication was consistent with Clouse's
memory and notes, and Clouse stated he attempted to retain
context by using the comments Clark made directly before and
directly after the comment at issue — and Clark has not
shown otherwise. Unlike Masson, there is no
substantial evidence that Clouse acted with a high degree of
awareness of probable falsity. Clark has failed to provide
sufficient evidence to show that a reasonable jury could find
by clear and convincing evidence that Clouse made the
publication in reckless disregard of the truth. See
Steele, 138 Idaho at 252, 61 P.3d at 609. Thus, we affirm
the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment because there
are no genuine issues of material fact as to the actual malice
element.
B. False Light
Clark contends Spokesman Review is not entitled to an award of
summary judgment on his false light claim. Publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye
requires that there be "public
Page 433
disclosure of falsity or fiction concerning the plaintiff."
Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 99 Idaho 688, 691,
587 P.2d 829, 832 (1978). Reconciling the demands of First
Amendment freedom of the press with libel and invasion of
privacy claims has placed a heavy burden on the plaintiff.
Bandelin, 98 Idaho at 339, 563 P.2d at 397. When a
communication is constitutionally privileged, a plaintiff must
prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence on his
invasion of privacy claims. Id. (citing Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456
(1967)).
As discussed above, Clark has failed to raise any issues of
material fact as to actual malice. Thus, we affirm summary
judgment on Clark's false light invasion of privacy claim.
C. Attorney Fees
Clark seeks attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. That
statute allows an award of "reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party. . . ." I.C. § 12-121. Clark is not a
prevailing party; thus, Clark is not entitled to attorney fees
on appeal.
Spokesman Review contends it is entitled to attorney fees
because Clark has no cogent basis for arguing the trial court
has misapplied the law. Spokesman Review, however, fails to
accompany its request for attorney fees with a reference to any
statutory provision authorizing the award. A party must point
to a statute or contractual provision authorizing an award of
attorney fees on appeal. State v. Daicel Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 109, 106 P.3d 428, 435 (2005).
Furthermore, Clark's appeal was not frivolous or without
foundation. Therefore, we decline to award attorney fees to
Spokesman Review.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm summary judgment in favor of Spokesman Review on
Clark's defamation and false light claims. We decline to award
either party attorney fees. Costs to respondent.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER and Justices TROUT, JONES and REINHARDT
Pro Tern concur.
[fn1] When a claim or part of a claim must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, generally on a motion for summary
judgment we do not consider whether a party has produced clear
and convincing evidence, but only "whether the evidence is
sufficient to create a triable issue of fact." Country Cove
Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 599, 150 P.3d 288, 292
(2006). However, we have adopted the United States Supreme
Court standard for ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a
defamation case which requires that the trial judge bear in
mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary and
noted the appropriateness of this standard is supported by the
"unique character of the interest protected by the actual
malice standard" and the duty a judge has to "independently
decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to
cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any
judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of
`actual malice.'" Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho at 575,
790 P.2d at 356 (quoting Harte-Hanks.
491 U.S. at 685-86, 109 S.Ct. at 2695, 105 L.Ed.2d at 588 (emphasis removed
and internal quotations omitted)).
[fn2] Clark also argues that the magistrate court applied the
wrong standard of review when it granted summary judgment based
on the actual malice element because the magistrate court
determined as a matter of law there was not clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice instead of whether a jury
could find there is clear and convincing proof that Spokesman
Review acted with actual malice. However, we review a grant of
summary judgment de novo. Post Falls Trailer Park,
131 Idaho at 636, 962 P.2d at 1020.
